Constitutional Risks of a Total Reform: Political Capture, Institutional Erosion, and Conflicts with Oversight Bodies in Colombia

Abstract

This article analyzes the constitutional risks facing Colombia in light of proposals to deeply reform the 1991 Constitution or to convene a National Constituent Assembly. While the 1991 Constitution established a social and democratic state governed by the rule of law, characterized by pluralism and strong guarantees of rights, its repeated amendments over more than three decades reveal both institutional flexibility and vulnerability to shifting political majorities. Drawing on the theory of abusive constitutionalism, the study argues that constitutional erosion does not require formal breakdowns or explicit democratic ruptures, but can occur through the strategic use of amendment mechanisms, politically aligned judicial reinterpretations, and legitimizing discourses that expand executive discretion while weakening institutional checks and balances. Comparative experiences from Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and El Salvador illustrate how constitutional reforms, prolonged states of exception, and the capture of high courts have facilitated power concentration and reduced political pluralism. Additionally, developments in the United States demonstrate that even without formal constitutional changes, the erosion of informal norms can strengthen executive authority, offering relevant warnings for Colombia in polarized political contexts.