Realism and representation of scientific theories in Physics

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.71112/9djmkr22

Keywords:

structural realism, scientific representation, ontic realism, theoretical change, philosophy of science

Abstract

Structural realism has emerged as a philosophical proposal that attempts to mediate between the opposing positions of scientific realism and anti-realism. This current argues that, while the entities postulated by scientific theories may be contingent or even eliminated in theoretical change, the structure underlying these theories tends to be preserved. This article argues that structural realism, particularly in its ontic variant, represents a robust response to the challenges posed by the history of science, scientific representation, and theoretical underdetermination. However, this position faces relevant objections, especially regarding the ontology of structures, the distinction between mathematics and physics, and the representational power of models. Based on the analysis of proposals by prominent authors, the paper defends the need to articulate a conception of scientific representation consistent with structure as an ontological entity, without falling into metaphysical duplication or excessive Platonism.

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Author Biographies

  • Carlos Rodriguez Benites, National University of Trujillo

    Licenciado en Educación, especialidad Física y Matemática, Licenciado, Magíster y Doctor en Ciencias Físicas. Docente investigador de pre y posgrado en Universidades Peruanas. Doctorando en Filosofía en la línea de Filosofía de la Ciencia.  

  • Lincoln Chiguala Contreras, Universidad Nacional Agraria de la Selva

    LICENCIADO EN FISICA DE LA UNT, MAGISTER EN EDUACION EN LA UDH, MAESTRO EN CIENCIAS FISICAS  EN LA UNT Y DOCTOR EN EDUCACION EN LA UCV; CON EXPERIENCIA EN TEMAS DE INVESTIGACION EN EDUCACION SUPERIOR Y FISICA APLICADA. DOCENTE ASOCIADO EN LA UNIVERIDAD NACIONAL AGRARIA DE LA SELVA, ESTOY AFILIADO A LA LINEA DE INVESTIGACION EN FISICA TEORICA Y APLICADA.

  • Susanita Lizeth Moreno Cavero, Antenor Orrego Private University

    Maestra en Investigación y Docencia Universitaria en la Universidad Católica de Trujillo, Licenciada en Ciencias Física en la Universidad Nacional de Trujillo, cinco años de experiencia laborando en educación superior, actualmente laborando en la Universidad Privada Antenor Orrego. Participante de diferentes Simposios y expositora en una oportunidad en Encuentro Científico Internacional.

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Published

2025-06-30

Issue

Vol. 2 No. 2 (2025)

Section

Essays

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Copyright (c) 2025 Multidisciplinary Journal Epistemology of the Sciences

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

How to Cite

Rodriguez Benites, C., Chiguala Contreras, L., & Moreno Cavero, S. L. (2025). Realism and representation of scientific theories in Physics. Multidisciplinary Journal Epistemology of the Sciences, 2(2), 1173-1188. https://doi.org/10.71112/9djmkr22

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