Realismo y representación de las teorías científicas en Física
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.71112/9djmkr22Palabras clave:
realismo estructural, representación científica, realismo óntico, cambio teórico, filosofía de la cienciaResumen
El realismo estructural ha emergido como una propuesta filosófica que intenta mediar entre las posiciones opuestas del realismo y el antirrealismo científicos. Esta corriente sostiene que, si bien las entidades postuladas por las teorías científicas pueden ser contingentes o incluso eliminadas en el cambio teórico, la estructura que subyace a estas teorías tiende a conservarse. En este artículo se argumenta que el realismo estructural, particularmente en su variante óntica, representa una respuesta robusta ante los desafíos planteados por la historia de la ciencia, la representación científica y la subdeterminación teórica. No obstante, esta posición enfrenta objeciones relevantes, especialmente sobre la ontología de las estructuras, la distinción entre lo matemático y lo físico, y el poder representacional de los modelos. A partir del análisis de propuestas de destacados autores se defiende la necesidad de articular una concepción de la representación científica coherente con la estructura como entidad ontológica, sin caer en una duplicación metafísica ni en un platonismo excesivo.
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